Confederate Defenses
of
Fayetteville
Confederate General Braxton Bragg’s evacuation of Wilmington on February 21, 1865 significantly increased the threat of a Union attack on Fayetteville. The loss of Wilmington and the Cape Fear River opened an accessible invasion route into the interior region of North Carolina and exposed Fayetteville and its Arsenal to attack. A member of the Arsenal garrison, Capt. James W. Strange, commander of Co. F, 2nd Battalion North Carolina Local Defense Troops, echoed these concerns. “I have thought until the evacuation of Wilmington that Fayetteville was one of the safest places in the Confederacy,” wrote Strange. He realized that Fayetteville’s location on the Cape Fear River exposed it to danger, understanding that an enemy force could “at any time that there is a swell in this river go up to Fayetteville in the gunboats and frigates.”
Bragg also recognized the potential threat to Fayetteville. When he evacuated Wilmington on February 21, Bragg notified the Fayetteville authorities that they were now vulnerable to attack from the Cape Fear. He advised Lt. Col. Frederick L. Childs at the Arsenal to evacuate “his most valuable stores, especially ammunition for small arms,” and procure the wagons necessary to transport these supplies to the nearest railroad depot. Future Confederate operations in North Carolina had no hope of success unless these critical supplies were secured.
Since assuming command in 1863, Childs had pondered how best to defend his post, fearing that Union cavalry forces stationed at New Bern posed a significant threat to the Arsenal. His initial assessment of the town’s defensive posture identified several major weaknesses. First, there were no prepared defensive lines or works along the town’s avenues of approach. Second, the Arsenal garrison had no mounted forces, thereby rendering Childs blind to possible enemy activity in the surrounding areas.
After identifying these shortfalls, Childs began strengthening the town’s defenses. Recognizing a need for earthworks, he appealed to the residents of Fayetteville to supply a labor force of 50 to 75 slaves. Childs directed the construction of these works along the key roads into Fayetteville and in the vicinity of the arsenal. (photographs of existing works)
In September 1863, Childs received authorization to raise Cos. C, D, and E for the purpose of local defense. (original request document) In 1864, the battalion was further expanded by the authorization of Co. F, a mounted force, and Co. G, consisting of soldiers detailed for light duty. With these additional companies, the 2nd Battalion, or “Arsenal Guards,” now consisted of seven companies mustering more than 500 men. (battalion organizational chart) Despite Childs’ efforts to bolster the Arsenal’s defenses, his motley command could not withstand the twin Union threats posed by Sherman’s and Schofield’s forces. Consequently, on February 22, 1865, Childs asked Bragg for guidance as to his intentions regarding the future of Fayetteville and the Arsenal. Childs rightly feared the possibility of an enemy advance on Fayetteville up the Cape Fear.
Bragg’s response was less than reassuring: “the enemy’s superior force will, I fear, enable him to send a detachment against you, which can only be met by your own resources.” Childs’ command was simply incapable of defending against a large-scale Union advance. In a February 23 message to Bragg, Childs reported his operative strength at about 250, with the possibility of 100 or 200 last-minute reinforcements. At that time, portions of the battalion were detached to other posts throughout the state.
The above introduction to Confederate efforts to strengthen Fayetteville’s defenses is from my book “No Such Army Since the Days of Julius Caesar” Sherman’s Carolinas Campaign: Fayetteville to Averasboro co-authored with Mark A. Smith.